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I. INTRODUCTION
Gone are the days when prepping for a case meant rummaging through
the library to find just the right book, and when pulling a client file entailed
actually going to a filing cabinet and finding the client’s folder. Today,
technology consumes the legal profession.1 The complexities of technology
have helped simplify a lawyer’s daily tasks.2 With the demise of paper,
lawyers today not only look to the Internet and electronic databases for
statutes and case law, but also use electronic records to store, and have at
their fingertips, important client information.3 The advancement in
technology has been two-fold to the legal community: (1) “decreas[ing]
processing time”4 by enhancing communication in lawyers’ relationships—
with clients, other attorneys, and the courts—and allowing access to
1. Cf. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 477, at 1 (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_national_security/ABA%20Fo
rmal%20Opinion%20477.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP4S-8NMZ] [hereinafter Formal
Op. 477] (recognizing “today, many lawyers primarily use electronic means to communicate and
exchange documents with clients, other lawyers, and even with other persons who are assisting a lawyer
in delivering legal services to clients”).
2. See Justin Ferrell, Cyber Liability and the Lawyer: A Tale of Anguish and Confusion, J. KAN. B.
ASS’N, Oct. 2015, at 8, 8 (“[T]echnology has made our lives much easier; instead of having a massive
library with books to wade through, we can now access thousands of cases . . . in a matter of seconds
with a Google search. What took hours, now takes seconds.”). But see id. (asserting most firms use
technology to store electronic records but will also keep paper copies of the electronically stored files).
3. See id. (describing the modern lawyers use of electronic records).
4. Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional Ethics at the Dawn
of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 115 (2011).
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hundreds, if not thousands, of documents compressed in small portable
devices; and (2) providing the lawyer with “global access to entire libraries
via website data banks.”5 Nevertheless, with such innovation comes the
threat of significant risk.6
A. Technology in the Legal Profession—The ABA’s Recognition of the Need for
Further Protection of Sensitive Data
The prevalence of the use of technology in the legal profession, from
storing electronic versions of client data to electronically filing court
documents, has not come without its costs.7 Documents that are
electronically stored and transmitted by law firms contain not only the
norm—names, phone numbers, addresses, and social security numbers—
but much more confidential and sensitive data.8 This information is
extremely attractive to hackers because it offers the potential for access to
valuable personal client information, such as “corporate clients’ businesses,
strategies, and proprietary interests.”9 This confidential information
becomes even more attractive when hackers realize how easy it is to gain
access to the valuable information.10 For example, consider a person who
has been a thief all of his life. One night, while walking in a store parking
lot, the thief notices a woman exiting a new, luxury vehicle. The thief then
realizes that he did not hear a car alarm beep, indicating that the woman
5. See id. (explaining how technology has helped in the legal profession).
6. See Michael McNerney & Emilian Papadopoulos, Hacker’s Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability
in the Cyber Age, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (2013) (acknowledging the evolution of technology and
the “numerous advantages” it has offered to the legal profession while recognizing that “without robust
security measures, it also means easier access to sensitive information for adversaries”); see also Ferrell,
supra note 2, at 8 (noting the evolution and ease of technology while bemoaning the “increased
problems and liabilities” it has created in the legal profession).
7. See Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 115 (recognizing some of the adjustments the legal
profession has had to make with the advancement of technology).
8. See Ferrell, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasizing the records electronically stored by law firms
contain “sensitive personal data, along with privileged and confidential information”).
9. See David Mandell & Karla Schaffer, The New Law Firm Challenge: Confronting the Rise of Cyber
Attacks and Preventing Enhanced Liability, LAW PRACT. TODAY (Mar. 2012), https://www.americanbar.
org/publications/law_practice_today_home/law_practice_today_archive/march12/the-new-lawfirm-challenge-confronting-the-rise-of-cyber-attacks-and-preventing-enhanced-liability.html [https://
perma.cc/2C2E-8582] (illustrating “[l]aw firms are increasingly becoming attractive targets to hackers
for the valuable client data on their servers”); see also McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 6, at 1250
(reaffirming that hackers are targeting law firms “because of the vast troves of sensitive information
they house on their networks”).
10. See McNerney & Papadopoulos, supra note 6, at 1250–51 (explaining how inadequate
protection of vast amounts of sensitive information make law firms soft targets to hackers).
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might have forgotten to lock it. Upon further inspection, the thief notes
that the vehicle is parked in the back of the lot, under a burnt-out light. As
the thief approaches the vehicle, he realizes that there is an expensivelooking leather bag in the car. What is the thief going to do? You would
not be cynical to think that the individual would have an opportunity and
motivation to steal the leather bag. This is what happens when a hacker
realizes that a law firm does not have a secure network or firewall protection
on their electronically stored data.
As technology evolves, so do the tactics hackers use to gain access to law
firm databases.11 Recognizing the progression of technology in the legal
profession, the American Bar Association (ABA) developed the
Commission on Ethics 20/20 to review and propose amendments to the
Model Rules.12 The purpose of the Commission is to aid lawyers, not only
to keep up with such technological advances, but also to advantageously use
those developments to serve clients to the best of their abilities.13 Just three
years after the creation of the Commission on Ethics 20/20, the
Commission proposed that the ABA amend specific rules “[t]o help lawyers
understand how to protect client confidences when using new technology—
such as ‘cloud’ computing, tablets, and smartphones.”14 Subsequently, in
August of 2012, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Commission’s
proposals.15 The following addresses the changes to Model Rules of
11. See id. at 1246 (“Much like technology itself, the nature of cyberattacks is constantly
evolving.”).
12. See Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Chair’s Message, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html [https://
perma.cc/9YHC-45PD] (explaining the ABA “created the Ethics 20/20 Commission to perform a
thorough review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct”).
13. See id. (“Our challenge over the next several years is to study these issues and, with 20/20
vision, propose policy recommendations that will allow lawyers to better serve their clients, the courts
and the public now and well into the future.”).
14. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, August 2012 Proposals, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120415_one_page_
summary_of_august_proposals.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S623-SQAS] (recognizing the
urgency to help lawyers understand the confidentiality risks when using technology and suggesting
amendments to help “clarify that lawyers should take reasonable precautions to protect client
confidences from inadvertent or unauthorized access or disclosure”).
15. See ABA CYBERSECURITY LEGAL TASK FORCE SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 109, at 12 (2014), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/events/law_national_security/2014annualmeeting/ABA%20-%20Cyber%20
Resolution%20109%20Final.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3DE-96CH]
[hereinafter
REVISED RESOLUTION 109] (“Resolutions 105 A, B and C, Adopted by the House of Delegates at the
2012 Annual Meeting in Chicago . . . .”).
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Professional Conduct (Model Rules) Rule 1.1 “Competence” and Rule 1.6
“Confidentiality of Information” (herein referred to collectively as the
“technology provisions”).
1.

Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1—Competence

The first change reflecting the ABA’s recognition of the risks posed to
lawyers through their use of technology is shown in Comment 8 of Rule 1.1
of the Model Rules.16 Comment 8 now reads:
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with
all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.17

This Comment illuminates the need of a lawyer to maintain competency by
“keep[ing] abreast of changes in the law and its practice” and, with the
addition of the italicized language, elucidates that a lawyer is also responsible
for keeping up with changes—and the benefits and risks those changes
cause—in technology.18
2. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6—Confidentiality of
Information
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules addresses a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality
to his clients.19 With the 2012 amendments, the ABA added paragraph (c)
to Rule 1.6, which reads: “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent
the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to,
information relating to the representation of a client.” 20 Unlike the
16. See Formal Op. 477, supra note 1, at 2 (indicating the scope of a lawyer’s duty of competency
“was clarified in 2012 when the ABA recognized the increasing impact of technology on the practice
of law and the duty of lawyers to develop an understanding of that technology”).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (emphasis
added).
18. See id.; see also Formal Op. 477, supra note 1, at 3 (stating “[t]he Commission concluded that,
in order to keep abreast of changes in law practice in a digital age, lawyers necessarily need to
understand basic features of relevant technology”).
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (categorizing the rule on confidentiality into
three subparts—each generally addressing what a lawyer may and may not do in regards to disclosure
of confidential client information).
20. See August 2012 Amendments to ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808_house_acti
on_compilation_redline_105a-f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUL3-MHMU] [hereinafter
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amendments made to Rule 1.1, Rule 1.6(c) does not directly refer to
technology.21 However, in using the term “information” generally, the rule
can be interpreted as requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to protect
all client information, whether in paper or electronic form. Further evidence
of this can be found in Comment 18 to the rule, which was also added
during the 2012 amendments.22 Comment 18 explains the requirements of
paragraph (c) first by stating that a lawyer is required “to act competently to
safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against
unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure[s.]”23 Comment 18 purports to tie together a lawyers duty of
competence, requiring a lawyer to keep abreast of changes in technology,
with a lawyers duty to take reasonable steps to protect against inadvertent
and unauthorized disclosures of client data.24 This means that to meet the
requirement of acting reasonably to protect client data against inadvertent
and unauthorized disclosures, one must also act competently by keeping
abreast of changes in technology.25
There has never been a more critical time in the United States to be aware
of the threat of cyberattacks.26 Nearly seven years have passed since the

August 2012 Amendments] (identifying the added provisions of rule 1.6 by underlining the changed or
added language).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).
22. See August 2012 Amendments, supra note 20 (underlining the language added to comment 18
of Model Rule 1.6 “Confidentiality of Information”).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
24. See Formal Op. 477, supra note 1, at 2–5 (explaining the connection between the Model
Rules on lawyer competency and confidentiality).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (evincing this idea by placing
comment 18 of Model Rule 1.6 under the section labeled: “Acting Competently to Preserve
Confidentiality”).
26. See James Booth, DLA Piper Hit by Cyber Attack With Phones and Computers Down Across the
Firm, LEGALWEEK (June 27, 2017, 10:23 AM), http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2017/06
/27/dla-piper-hit-by-cyber-attack-with-phones-and-computers-down-across-the-firm/ [https://per
ma.cc/5YJV-JJ9E] (detailing the cyberattack on global law firm DLA Piper which caused its “offices
in the UK, Europe, the Middle East and the US” to be affected); see also Lori Grisham, Timeline: North
Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014, 6:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-hack-timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/ [https:
//perma.cc/5W8U-2JSU] (reporting on the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in which
hackers stole personal information, emails, and unreleased movies, ultimately causing the studio to
release the movie via Google Play, YouTube Movies, Microsoft’s Xbox Video and the website
www.seetheinterview.com); Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, The Perfect Weapon: How
Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html [https://perma.cc/7RQV-GVE5] (addressing
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2012 technology provisions were added to Model Rules 1.1 and 1.6, and, as
of early 2019, thirty-six states have incorporated the ABA’s 2012 technology
provisions, or some similar form or part, to their state rules of professional
conduct for lawyers.27 Most recently added to that list is the state of
Texas.28 While the implementation of the technology provisions has not
stopped cyber-criminals from attacking law firms, the goal of the technology
provisions of the Model Rules is to bring awareness to the emerging threat
on electronically stored sensitive client information and other law firm data
in the hopes that lawyers will make “reasonable efforts to prevent . . .
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure[s.]”29
B. Modern Law Firm Cyberattacks
With the advent of technology and the change from paper to electronic
records, it is of no surprise that law firms would face “increased problems
and liabilities.”30 Law firms have become particularly lucrative targets of
hacking because law firm databases hold vast amounts of private and
privileged confidential client data.31 However, law firms are targeted not
the alleged hack on the Democratic National Committee by Russian intelligence agents which resulted
in the procurement and online release of the DNC’s “private emails and confidential documents”).
27. See Robert Ambrogi, 36 States Have Adopted the Duty of Technology Competence, LAWSITES,
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/6WNS-MBXR] (listing the states
that have adopted technology rules similar to those found in the 2012 amendments to the Model Rules).
28. Id.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c); see Matt Nelson, New Changes to Model Rules
a Wake-up Call for Technologically Challenged Lawyers, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.law.com/insidecounsel/2013/03/28/new-changes-to-model-rules-a-wake-up-call-fortech/ [https://perma.cc/DG7T-9JY4] (“[T]he amendment is intended to serve as a reminder to
lawyers that they should remain aware of technology, including the benefits and risks associated with
it, as part of a lawyer’s general ethical duty to remain competent.”).
The amendment to Comment 8 illustrates the ABA’s desire to nudge lawyers into the 21st century
when it comes to technology. . . . The amendment to Model Rule 1.1 may not immediately change
the game for lawyers, but it reinforces what most already know, yet some ignore. Lawyers owe
clients an ethical duty to obtain technical proficiency sufficient to ensure competent
representation of clients.
Id.
30. Ferrell, supra note 2, at 8.
31. See Drew T. Simshaw, Legal Ethics and Data Security: Our Individual and Collective Obligation to
Protect Client Data, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549, 550 (2015) (“Law firms are especially attractive targets
to hackers. This attractiveness is largely because of two compounding perceptions about law firms:
that they are valuable targets and that they are easy targets.”); see also Travis Andrews, Note, Technology
& Legal Ethics: The Need for Uniform Regulation, 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 185, 186 (2016) (“[H]ackers also
target law firms because, in the fabled words of Willie Sutton, ‘that’s where the money is.’” (quoting
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only because of the vast amounts of invaluable information their databases
hold, but also because of the relative ease hackers have in accessing those
databases.32 One of the most notable law firm breaches was that of
Mossack Fonseca, a Panama City-based law firm with offices around the
world.33 The hackers were able to steal, and then release, more than eleven
million documents which came to be known as the Panama Papers.34 So
why Mossack Fonseca? Prior to the extensive news coverage of the breach,
Mossack Fonseca was not a name many would recognize.35 Hackers,
however, knew what they were going after—a law firm that helped the
world’s richest store their money in off-shore accounts.36 The most
appalling thing about the hack was how easy it was for the hackers to access
Mossack Fonseca’s files.37 Mossack Fonseca failed to update its software,
making its privately hosted webserver particularly vulnerable to attacks. 38
In June of 2017, reports surfaced about a cyberattack on global law firm
DLA Piper.39 Notably, the effects of the attack were felt at DLA Piper’s

Willie Sutton, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/williesutton (last visited Mar. 5, 2015))).
32. See Simshaw, supra note 31, at 550–51 (analyzing why law firms are particularly attractive to
hackers).
33. See David A. Graham, What is Mossack Fonseca, the Law Firm in the Panama Papers?, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/panamapapers-mossack-fonseca/476727/ [https://perma.cc/K2V5-NA2C] (discussing Mossack Fonseca and
how the firm “has become a global behemoth [with] hundreds of employees spread around the world”).
34. Julie Sobowale, 6 Major Law Firm Hacks in Recent History, ABA J. (Mar. 2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/law_firm_hacking_history [https://perma.cc/85TDFW96] (examining the cyberattack on Mossack Fonseca).
35. See Graham, supra note 33 (implying Mossack Fonseca kept out of the public eye prior to
the cyberattack by stating “[t]he Panama Papers put a much greater focus than ever before on a firm
whose stock in trade is maintaining opacity for its clients—a strategy it has pursued for itself”).
36. See Kirk Semple, Authorities Raid Law Firm at Center of Panama Papers Leak, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/world/americas/authorities-raid-law-firmat-center-of-panama-papers-leak.html [https://perma.cc/2MNH-TRWN] (describing the type of legal
work Mossack Fonseca performs for its clients).
37. See Jason Bloomberg, Cybersecurity Lessons Learned From ‘Panama Papers’ Breach, FORBES
(Apr. 21, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2016/04/21/cybersec
urity-lessons-learned-from-panama-papers-breach/#5776ca5b2003 [https://perma.cc/UAK5-6VAF]
(“[T]he Mossack Fonseca attack was dead simple. So simple, in fact, that a teenager with no hacking
knowledge other than basic googling skills could have done it.”).
38. See id. (explaining how hackers were able to access Mossack’s files).
39. See Jeff John Roberts, Law Firm DLA Piper Reels Under Cyber Attack, Fate of Files Unclear,
FORTUNE (June 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/29/dla-piper-cyber-attack/ [https://perma.
cc/4NXS-93TB] (“For DLA Piper, its nightmare . . . led the firm to shut down digital operations in
offices around the world.”).
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Washington, D.C. location.40 There, upon entering the office, employees
were met with a sign directing them to refrain from turning on any office
computers.41 Reports described the account as a ransomware attack on the
law firm, which caused “the global law firm to shut down or limit its email
for hours on end and to work off of cellphones.”42 DLA Piper deferred
commenting on any specific details of the attack.43 However, by looking at
the clients the firm serves and its revenue—an estimated $2.5 billion in
2015—it is not difficult to determine why the firm was targeted.44 The
attack on DLA Piper differed from the attack on Mossack Fonseca. Instead
of stealing and distributing confidential files, DLA Piper claimed it was able
to prevent the hackers from taking any confidential client data.45 While
DLA Piper was able to safely emerge after the cyberattack without allegedly
losing any sensitive client data, the fact that the hackers were able to break
into its system is enough to cause alarm.46
Even more recent is the data breach on off-shore law firm, Appleby.47
In October of 2017, the firm confirmed that it had been hacked and, more
40. See id. (displaying a photo of a sign posted outside of DLA Piper’s Washington, D.C. office
which warned employees to refrain from turning on any computers).
41. See id. (referencing a tweet sent showing a photo of the posted sign).
42. See Gabe Friedman, DLA Piper’s Cyber Attack and Why It Matters, BIG L. BUS. (June 28, 2017),
https://biglawbusiness.com/dla-pipers-cyber-attack-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/K54K3NA2] (describing the breach as a ransomware attack). But see Ed Beeson, 3 Lessons For Firms After
Cyberattack on DLA Piper, LAW360 (June 29, 2017, 11:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
939832/3-lessons-for-firms-after-cyberattack-on-dla-piper
[https://perma.cc/Z26R-NUKB]
(categorizing the breach as a malware attack and discounting the previous belief that it was a
ransomware attack).
43. Roberts, supra note 39 (explaining initially DLA Piper “declined to answer questions” but
when a spokesperson for the firm eventually gave a statement, he “did not elaborate as to whether any
data had been wiped in the attack”).
44. See Chris Johnson, The Am. Law 100: DLA Revenue Tops $2.5 Billion, But Profits Fall: The Early
Numbers, AM. LAW. (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202750656611
[https://perma.cc/T4AW-HUKP] (alluding DLA Piper was a “rich” target because their revenues
surpassed $2.5 billion in 2015).
45. See Malware Attack Update: A Note of Gratitude to Our Clients and People, DLA PIPER (July 10,
2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/focus/dla-piper-malware-attack-update/ [https://perma.cc
/N3G5-PNZU] (informing clients that they “took immediate steps to contain the situation” and were
able to secure all client data).
46. See Beeson, supra note 42 (“[I]t was threatening enough for the firm to immediately shut
down its networks and remain offline into Thursday—causing untold disruption to potentially
thousands of lawyers across the globe.”).
47. See Anna Ward, Big Offshore Law Firm in Spotlight as Data Hack Spills Client Secrets, AM. LAW.
(Nov. 6, 2017, 10:51 A.M.), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/sites/americanlawyer/2017/11/
06/appleby-under-the-spotlight-as-data-hack-releases-millions-of-client-documents-to-media/?kw=B
ig%20Offshore%20Law%20Firm%20in%20Spotlight%20as%20Data%20Hack%20Spills%20Client
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specifically, stated that client information “was in the hands of the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.”48 In a statement to
the media, Appleby remarked that its systems were accessed by a
professional hacker who “covered his [or] her tracks to the extent that a
forensic investigation by a leading international Cyber & Threats team
concluded that there was no definitive evidence that any data had left [its]
systems.”49 As with the other big law firm data breaches, Appleby is a
prominent off-shore firm representing clients such as United States
Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, Nike Inc., Apple Inc., and Uber
Technologies Inc.50 Acknowledging the possible repercussions, Appleby
quickly went on the defensive, emphasizing that client confidentiality was of
the utmost importance to the firm and condemning the media for
publishing the illegally obtained material.51 While recognizing that client
confidentiality is important, Appleby still failed to protect that confidential
information adequately.
The cyberattacks suffered by each of the three aforementioned law firms
demonstrate that law firms are prime targets for hackers. With the growth
and further development of technology, hackers will find various methods
of attempting to breach law firm databases.52 Evident by the creation of
the Cybersecurity Legal Task Force, the implementation of the technology
provisions, and the numerous resources on protecting client data, the
ABA—as well as the states that have adopted the technology provisions—
%20Secrets&et=editorial&bu=The%20American%20Lawyer&cn=20171106&src=EMC-Email&pt=
Afternoon%20Update [https://perma.cc/L52L-FL6A] (reporting on the “intense scrutiny” faced by
Appleby “amid a massive cybersecurity breach that . . . released millions of documents into the public
domain”).
48. Jake Bernstein, The Paradise Papers Hacking and the Consequences of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/opinion/paradise-papers-hacking-privacy.
html [https://perma.cc/3YTF-U384].
49. Appleby Reaction to Media Coverage, APPLEBY (May 11, 2017), https://www.applebyglobal.
com/media-statements/appleby-reaction-to-media-coverage.aspx [https://perma.cc/8E8R-U42T].
50. See Bernstein, supra note 48 (“Appleby is a major player in a global offshore industry that
helps multinational corporations and the mega-wealthy legally move money beyond the reach of the
taxman through a network of tax havens and secret financial centers.”); see also Ward, supra note 47
(listing some of Appleby’s major clients as “Apple, Nike, Uber and other global companies”).
51. See Appleby Reaction to Media Coverage, supra note 49 (stressing their commitment to client
confidentiality while denouncing any wrongdoing by the firm, its employees, or its clients).
52. See J.P. Donlon, The Changing Nature of Cyber Threats: What CEOs Need to Know, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://chiefexecutive.net/changing-nature-cyber-threats-ceos-needknow/ [https://perma.cc/J6NG-WSQX] (demonstrating hackers are already finding new methods to
breach databases by stating “almost three-quarters of American companies cite the evolving nature of
cyber threats as a major security challenge for their businesses”).
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recognizes the substantial threat to the legal profession. 53 Texas should not
be waiting on the defensive for a major cyberattack to hit a Texas-based law
firm. Recently, the Texas Supreme Court has amended the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (Texas Disciplinary Rules)—
joining the list of states that have included at least some reference to the use
of technology in the legal profession.54 Comment 8 of Texas Disciplinary
Rule 1.01 now reads:
Because of the vital role of lawyers in the legal process, each lawyer should
strive to become and remain proficient and competent in the practice of law,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.55

While the amendment to the Texas Disciplinary Rules is a step in the right
direction, it fails to place any meaningful duty or obligation on practicing
Texas attorneys. The amendment encompasses a provision similar to
Comment 8 of Model Rule 1.156; however, the amended comment fails to
place a duty on the lawyer to make “reasonable efforts to prevent the
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of” client information.57 More can
and must be done to safeguard electronic client data and hold the lawyer
53. See About the Task Force, A.B.A. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/cybersecurity/
aboutcyber.html [https://perma.cc/46WB-G585] (“The task force will examine risks posed by
criminals, terrorists and nations that hope to steal personal and financial information, disrupt critical
infrastructure, and wage a new kind of warfare on a battlefield of ones and zeros.”); see also REVISED
RESOLUTION 109, supra note 15, at 14 (asserting the purpose of the resolution is “to educate
organizations and heighten their sensitivity to cybersecurity risks, and help them effectively evaluate
their own specific risks and respond on behalf of their organization”); Ambrogi, supra note 27
(demonstrating the majority of states recognize the potential and significant threat of cyber breaches
to lawyers and law firms by their implementation of technology provisions); Sarah Andropoulos, Most
States Now Require Tech Competence for Lawyers. What Does That Mean For You?, LEGAL MARKETING &
TECH. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017), https://onward.justia.com/2017/02/09/states-now-require-techcompetence-lawyers-mean/ [https://perma.cc/SQ33-U9CY] (reaffirming the idea that states are
recognizing the risks posed by the use of technology by stating “[c]urrently over half of all jurisdictions
have enacted rules mandating that attorneys become and remain familiar with technologies that may
impact their practices”); Gorelick & Traynor, supra note 12 (acknowledging the purpose of the Ethics
20/20 Commission is “to perform a thorough review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the U.S. system of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice
developments” (emphasis added)).
54. Order Amending Comment to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct at 3,
No. 19–9016 (Tex. Feb. 26, 2019); Ambrogi, supra note 27.
55. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01 cmt. 8, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (emphasis added).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
57. Id. R. 1.6(c).
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accountable for failing to make reasonable efforts to do so. Following the
lead of the technology provisions set forth in the Model Rules, Texas must
further amend its disciplinary rules to compel lawyers to make educated and
reasonable decisions when using technology and electronic versions of
client data. Specifically, aside from adding a comment to its rule on
competence, the Texas Supreme Court needs to amend its confidentiality
rule to include language in the actual rule that will require the lawyer to
safeguard even “inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures” of client
information.
C. Scope of the Comment
This Comment seeks to address the inadequacy of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules in holding lawyers accountable for safeguarding electronic client
data—or failing to do so.58 However, this Comment does not purport to
argue that the implementation of the technology provisions to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules will stop cyber-criminals from attempting to breach law
firm databases in Texas. Instead, the goal of this Comment is to show how
the implementation of technology provisions, similar to those of the Model
Rules, will help Texas attorneys, Texas courts, and ultimately, the clients of
Texas lawyers. Part II of this Comment outlines a brief background on the
relationship between the Model Rules and Texas Disciplinary Rules.
Part III provides an analysis on how the implementation of the technology
provisions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules will be beneficial to attorneys by
providing them with notice of the ongoing risk of cyber breaches and
warning them that failure to protect against a breach may result in civil
liability.
Additionally, Part III will analyze the potential civil claims against an
attorney for inadvertently disclosing confidential client data, while also
recognizing the limitations to a civil claim under Texas law. Finally, Part III
will reason that, with the implementation of technology provisions, an
58. This comment was written prior to the Texas Supreme Court’s order amending Comment
8 of Rule 1.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules to include a provision stating that “each lawyer should
strive to become and remain proficient and competent in the practice of law, including the benefits
and risks associated with relevant technology. Order Amending Comment to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct at 3, No. 19–9016 (Tex. Feb. 26, 2019). However, the necessity and
importance of this comment remains as the Texas Supreme Court has yet to include any rule within
the Texas Disciplinary Rules placing an affirmative duty on lawyers to protect electronic client data
from inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures. Portions of this comment have been edited to reflect
the change to Comment 8 of Rule 1.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules.
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attorney may still be held accountable for such conduct through disciplinary
action. Part IV will conclude with a brief explanation of how the
modernization of the Texas Disciplinary Rules—through the
implementation of the technology provisions—will ultimately help in
safeguarding electronic data.
II. BACKGROUND
The correlation between the ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Texas Disciplinary Rules goes as far back as 1908.59 That year, the ABA
adopted the original Canons of Ethics, which guided the standards of ethical
conduct for lawyers.60 Following the ABA’s adoption of ethics rules, the
Texas Bar Association voluntarily followed suit and adopted those same
canons.61 When the Texas legislature mandated the creation of the State
Bar of Texas, the bar formally passed the same Canons of Ethics adopted
by the ABA and by the prior Texas Bar Association.62 Eventually, the ABA
replaced the Canons of Ethics with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.63 Texas, yet again, emulated the ABA by creating and
adopting their version of the code—the Texas Code of Professional
Responsibility.64
In 1983, the ABA opted to replace the Model Code with the Model Rules,
which are currently in effect today.65 The replacement of the ABA’s Model
Code then prompted the Texas State Bar to consider its own Code of
Professional Responsibility.66 After three years of formulation and
consideration, the board of directors of the Texas State Bar adopted the
proposed rules and, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas ordered a
59. See CHARLES F. HERRING, JR., JASON M. PANZER & LEAH TURNER, TEXAS LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & LAWYER DISCIPLINE 315 (15th ed. 2016) (“Ethics rules for lawyers in Texas have
tracked the American Bar Association’s rules through the years[.]”).
60. See Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 929, 935 (2007) (“The American Bar Association . . . adopted Canons of Professional
Ethics in 1908[.]”).
61. HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Richmond, supra note 60, at 935 (“In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
66. See James B. Sales, The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: A Model to Replace the
Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, 52 TEX. B.J. 388, 388 (1989) (“After the adoption of the
ABA Model Rules in 1983, the President of the State Bar of Texas . . . appointed a blue-ribbon
committee . . . to formulate a proposed new code specially tailored to the Texas practice.”).
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referendum.67 “[P]atterned after the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct[,]” members of the State Bar voted to adopt the Texas Disciplinary
Rules, which became effective on January 1, 1990.68 Almost thirty years
later, the Texas Disciplinary Rules are still in effect today and set forth the
“standards of ethical conduct for purposes of lawyer discipline.” 69 In those
thirty years, the Texas Disciplinary Rules have been amended less than a
handful of times.70 Since the enactment of the Texas Disciplinary Rules in
1990, technology, and its use in the legal profession, has changed
drastically.71 Recognizing the advancement of technology and the threat it
posed to the legal profession, as noted previously, the ABA amended the
Model Rules in 2012 to reflect those changes and help protect against the
risks posed by technological advancement.72 Evident by the long-standing
history, the Texas lawyer professional conduct rules have generally been
amended in correlation with changes made to the ABA’s ethics rules.73 It
has been almost seven years since the ABA amended the Model Rules to

67. See id. at 390 (detailing the lengthy process when attempting to adopt a new set of
professional rules). The President of the Texas State Bar at the time, James B. Sales, recognized the
need for an updated set of professional rules. See id. at 391 (writing to urge members of the State Bar
to vote on an overhauled version of lawyer professional conduct rules). In his article asking members
of the State Bar to vote for the adoption of the new Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
he stated:
Considering the myriad of changes that have evolved in the practice of law, coupled with the
adoption of newly formulated duties owed by lawyers to their clients, these rules are, by any
comparative standard of measurement, outdated, antiquated and too often irrelevant to the
manner in which law is practiced in today’s society.
Id. at 388.
68. HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315; see generally Texas Legal Ethics, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/tx/narr/TX_NARR_0.HTM [https://perma.cc/K89N-G8XJ]
(outlining the background behind the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct).
69. HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315.
70. See id. at 315 (showing the substantial difference between the ABA’s more than 20 revisions
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct since their inception in 1983 in comparison to the revisions
to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct since their enactment in 1990).
71. See Sunil Gupta, Impact of Technology on Legal Profession in America, ENGADGET (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/13/impact-of-technology-on-legal-profession-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/8CS5-L3A8] (noting the “major differences in the technology and law firm[s] of
past, present and future”).
72. See Jody R. Westby, Cybersecurity & Law Firms: A Business Risk, L. PRAC. MAG., July–
Aug. 2013, at 46, 46 (reporting the ABA directed its focus to law firm cyber security after, in early 2012,
the FBI issued warnings to law firms about “the risk of breaches and theft of client data”).
73. See generally HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315 (outlining the interaction between the
ABA’s version of professional conduct rules and those of the Texas State Bar).
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include the technology provisions.74 While this past February’s amendment
to Comment 8 of Rule 1.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules was a step in
the right direction, it is time for Texas to follow suit once again and be in
uniformity with the majority.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Lawyer Accountability—Providing the Attorney with Notice
In the illustrious words of Justice Cardozo: “A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.”75 The lawyer-client relationship is a special relationship of trust
and confidence.76 The legal profession is one of service; without the client,
the title of lawyer would cease to exist. Upon receiving their license to
practice law in Texas, the State Bar requires all new lawyers to take the oath
of office.77 In the oath, the lawyer promises to serve clients to the best of
his or her abilities.78 Recognizing this special relationship, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the Texas Disciplinary Rules each include a
specific section dedicated to the lawyer-client relationship. 79 Additionally,
the Texas Lawyer’s Creed asserts the following:
74. See August 2012 Amendments, supra note 20 (identifying the 2012 changes to the Model Rules).
75. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (declaring one in a fiduciary
relationship owes additional duties and protections in comparison to parties working together in an
arm’s length transaction).
76. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 461 (1963) (“The relation of attorney and client is that
of master and servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence.”
(quoting In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910))); see also Willis v. Maverick,
760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) (“A fiduciary relationship exists between attorney and client.” (citing
McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.))).
77. New Lawyer Oath and Fees, ST. B. OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=New_Lawyer_Forms_and_Fees1&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Co
ntentID=30304 [https://perma.cc/546K-R348] (detailing the requirements for lawyers who have
recently passed the Texas State Bar).
78. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.037(a)(3) (“Each person admitted to practice law shall,
before receiving a license, take an oath that the person will . . . discharge the attorney’s duty to the
attorney’s client to the best of the attorney’s ability[.]”).
79. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01–1.15, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (dedicating fifteen out of a total of
fifty-three rules to the “client-lawyer relationship”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.1–1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (devoting one section of the rules to the “client-lawyer
relationship”); TEX. YOUNG LAWYERS’ ASS’N, TEXAS LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1–8 (4th ed.
2007) [hereinafter TEXAS LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL ETHICS] (indicating the section on the client-
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A lawyer owes to a client allegiance, learning, skill, and industry. A lawyer
shall employ all appropriate legal means to protect and advance the client’s
legitimate rights, claims, and objectives. A lawyer shall not be deterred by any
real or imagined fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity, nor be
influenced by mere self-interest.80

Professional conduct rules help to put a lawyer on notice of the
responsibilities and duties he or she, as a lawyer, has in the profession. 81
More specifically, rules of professional conduct assist a lawyer by laying out
what obligations they owe to their clients.82
In Texas, a lawyer must abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules.83 As such,
the implementation of technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules will place the lawyer on notice of a growing problem faced by law
firms and the risks associated with those problems. 84 First, such a rule
would warn the lawyer of the threat of inadvertent and unauthorized data
breaches. In the past few years, reports on data breaches of major law firms
have flooded the news media.85 Reported far less often, are data breaches
lawyer relationship is the “longest chapter [in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct],
and it contains the greatest number of rules”).
80. TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED—A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM ¶ II.
81. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 7 (“The Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . stat[e] minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action.”).
82. See id. preamble ¶ 1–16 (explaining that a lawyer owes certain responsibilities to its clients).
In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue clients’ interests within the bounds
of the law. In doing so, a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should
maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in
confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required
or permitted by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
Id. preamble ¶ 3; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 2 (expressing some of a
lawyer’s duties as a representative of their clients).
83. See GOV’T § 81.072(d) (“Each attorney is subject to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
84. See Andropoulos, supra note 53 (affirming this idea by stating “[w]hile this update to the
Model Rules . . . did not necessarily represent a change in a lawyer’s obligations relative to technology,
it certainly served to highlight them”).
85. See Matthew Goldstein, Cravath Discloses Breach, Saying It Was ‘Limited’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2016, at B4 (“One big firm that has confirmed it was the victim of a ‘limited breach’ of its computer
network is Cravath Swaine & Moore, based in New York, which may be best known for its corporate
merger advisory work.”); see also Tom Risen, Mossack Fonseca Blames Panama Papers Leak on Hackers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 6 2016, 11:20 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016-04-06/mossack-fonseca-blames-panama-papers-leak-on-hackers [https://perma.cc/AU3D-8S
LV] (reporting law firm Mossack Fonseca fell victim to “the biggest data leak in history”); Roberts,
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on small to midsize firms.86 A trap for small to midsize firms to fall into is
the idea that it will not happen to them.87 However, as previously discussed,
law firms are generally attacked for two reasons: (1) the vast amount of
confidential information they hold; and (2) because hackers realize they do
not have adequate protection on their information systems. 88 Even smaller
law firms—that do not have a lengthy client list of millionaire clients and
large corporations—still hold valuable data such as names, birth certificates,
social security numbers, and litigation strategies.89 A survey taken in 2016
found that 26% of law firms with 500 or more attorneys had experienced
some type of security breach.90 On its heels, 25% of law firms with
10–49 attorneys reported that they had faced some type of security

supra note 39 (publicizing the cyberattack on “prominent global law firm” DLA Piper); Ward, supra
note 47 (announcing “[l]eading offshore [law] firm Appleby” suffered “a massive breach of more than
13 million files”).
86. See CNA PROF’L COUNSEL, SAFE AND SECURE: CYBER SECURITY PRACTICES
FOR LAW FIRMS 2 (2015), http://gsagency.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Safe-and-SecureCyber-Security-Practices-for-Law-Firms.pdf [https://perma.cc/37TW-RQLF] (“Data breaches within
law firms are rarely reported in mainstream news outlets, and those law firms affected by data breaches
usually prefer not to publicize the breaches.”).
87. See id. (“This general underreporting of data breaches within the profession has led many
lawyers to greatly underestimate their own data security risks. As a result of this misplaced sense of
security, many law firms have failed to take necessary steps to improve their data security.”); see also
David Ries, Security, ABA TECHREPORT (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/techreport/2016/security/security.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HKJ8GEMY] (“Some attorneys and law firms may not be devoting more attention and resources to security
because they mistakenly believe it won’t happen to them.”).
88. Simshaw, supra note 31, at 550 (asserting law firms are targeted because they “collect and
store large amounts of critical, highly valuable corporate records, including intellectual property,
strategic business data, and litigation-related theories and records collected through e-discovery” and
“because they are viewed as easy targets” (quoting REVISED RESOLUTION 109, supra note 15, at 4)).
89. See John G. Browning, Why Cybercriminals are Targeting Law Firms, DIRECTORIES MAG.
(July 2016), https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2016/july-august/cybercrime-targetslaw-firms/ [https://perma.cc/BU8T-7Y6E] (discussing the data hack on small Clarendon, Texas based
law firm to reaffirm “[c]yber threats are not limited to large firms engaged in multibilliondollar M&A deals”); see also LOGICFORCE, LAW FIRM CYBER SECURITY SCORECARD 3, https://
www.logicforce.com/2018/03/28/law-firm-cyber-security-scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/J5BZ-9M
FK] (“We see consistent evidence that cyber attacks on law firms are non-discriminatory. Size and
revenues don’t seem to matter.”).
90. See Ries, supra note 87, at 1 (describing the results of the 2016 ABA Legal Technology Survey
Report which “explores security incidents and the security measures that reporting attorneys are using”).
While the survey found that only 14% of respondents overall had reported experiencing some type of
data breach, what is most unnerving is that “it also shows that many are not using security measures
that are viewed as basic by security professionals and are used more frequently in other businesses and
professions.” Id. at 1–2.
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breach.91 These numbers only reflect law firms that have actually
recognized that they were victims of a security breach. 92 Notably, another
study published in 2017 found that out of the 200 law firms studied, 40%
of those assessed did not know that they had been breached. 93
While not reported as often, small to midsize firms are still at risk. 94
Attorneys in Texas are required to know and abide by the Texas Disciplinary
Rules.95 The implementation of technology provisions, which would
require the attorney to keep abreast of changes in technology and “make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure” of
client data, would warn all attorneys—whether from large or small law
firms—of the significant threat posed to all law firms.96 The addition of
technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules will caution the
attorney that by not complying, he may be breaching a duty subject to civil
liability.97 In turn, this will encourage lawyers and law firms to consider the
91. See id. at 2 (reporting the survey found that “one in four respondents from firms with 10–
49 attorneys . . . reported that their firm had experienced a data breach at some time”). Even more
alarming is the fact that 63% of the surveyed firms with 10–49 attorneys reported that they had been
infected with some type of virus, spyware, or malware. See id. (explaining the results of the survey’s
inquiry into infections of law firm technology).
92. See id. at 3 (disclosing 66% of respondents “reported that their firm had not experienced a
breach”). However, this number only speaks of those firms surveyed that actually knew and reported
that they had experienced a breach. See id. (“A common saying in security today is that there are two
kinds of companies: those that know they’ve been breached and those that have been breached but
don’t know it. The same is likely true for law firms.”).
93. LOGICFORCE, supra note 89, at 3. The 40% of law firms that did not know they had been
breached does not represent 40% of the total surveyed. Id. The 40% represents those that that were
actually assessed. Id. Those assessed compromised 49% of the total firms participating in the survey.
Id.
94. See Browning, supra note 89 (recognizing large law firms are not the only ones at risk); see
also Ries, supra note 87, at 2 (suggesting some lawyers and law firms don’t allocate more time, attention,
and resources to cybersecurity because they believe they are not at risk of a breach).
95. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(d) (implying a Texas lawyer must be familiar with the
Disciplinary Rules by stating that he or she is “subject” to them).
96. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also id.
R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (clarifying what is required of a lawyer to maintain competence).
97. Cf. Gillespie v. Hernden, 516 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied)
(affirming the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff-client’s motion for summary judgment while
recognizing a court may look to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct to “discern the
policies and protections embodied in them as an aid in deciding questions of attorney civil liability”
(first citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); then citing Hoover Slovacek, LLP v.
Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2006); then citing Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317–19 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1994, no writ); and then citing In re Estate of Arizola, 401 S.W.3d 664, 671–72 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied))).

162

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 10:144

security measures they have in place and determine whether they are
adequate to protect their electronically stored data. The addition will
ultimately serve to protect the law firm, individual lawyers, and their clients
against possible data breaches.
B. Limitations to Prosecuting Claims: The Texas Anti-Fracturing Rule
Due to the special relationship between the lawyer and client, a lawyer
should be held accountable for any subpar representation, including any
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures of confidential client data caused by
the lawyer’s failure to take reasonable steps in protecting that data. 98
Without the technology provisions, it would be implausible for a lawyer to
be held accountable for an inadvertent disclosure through disciplinary action
under the Texas Disciplinary Rules.99 One argument to be made is that,
where a lawyer inadvertently discloses confidential client data by failing to
take reasonable steps to protect that data, a client could still bring a civil
action against the lawyer.100 However, in looking at the possible claims one
could bring for an inadvertent or unauthorized release of confidential client
data, Texas law would make it particularly difficult for a client to succeed on
a number of claims.101
In discerning all of the potential claims a client could bring against an
attorney for inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of confidential client
98. See David J. Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 547, 607–09 (1998)
(recognizing the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and client and asserting “all transactions
between attorney and client growing out of such relationship are subject to the closest scrutiny”).
99. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 7 (implying a lawyer will only be
subject to disciplinary action if his or her conduct falls below the minimum standards set forth in the
rules).
100. See Andrews, supra note 31, at 196 (“Legal malpractice claims may serve to regulate lawyers,
and at the heart of any claim are unfulfilled client expectations.” (footnote omitted)). But see McNerney
& Papadopoulos, supra note 6, at 1260 (“While there has been a lot of discussion regarding attorneys’
professional responsibility obligations of competence and confidentiality in cyberspace, there have
been few cases directly litigating this issue.”).
101. See Sledge v. Alsup, 759 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no writ) (demonstrating
Texas case laws’ intolerance for “fracturing a cause of action”).
If a lawyer’s error or mistake is actionable, it should give rise to a cause of action for legal
malpractice with one set of issues which inquire if the conduct or omission occurred, if that
conduct or omission was malpractice and if so, subsequent issues on causation and damages.
Nothing is to be gained in fracturing that cause of action into three or four different claims and
sets of special issues. That is not in accordance with the recent trend in this state to simplify
issues which are presented to a jury.
Id. (first citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 277; then citing Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984)).
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data—legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract—the
possibilities appear endless.102 However, with the anti-fracturing rule,
Texas courts have substantially limited the number and types of claims that
a client may bring against an attorney.103 The anti-fracturing rule prevents
a plaintiff from bringing multiple claims against a lawyer when the basis of
each claim is alleged negligence by the lawyer.104 This means that where a
plaintiff brings a legal malpractice claim along with other similar claims
against his or her lawyer based on the adequacy, or lack thereof, of the
lawyer’s representation, the anti-fracturing rule would apply, and the
additional claims would be subsumed into a legal malpractice cause of

102. See Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied) (acknowledging first “[l]egal malpractice is not the only cause of action under which a client
can recover from her attorney” but then asserting “Texas law . . . does not permit a plaintiff to divide
or fracture her legal malpractice claims into additional causes of action” (first citing Kahlig v. Boyd,
980 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); then citing Greathouse v.
McConnell, 982 S.W.2d 165, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); then citing Smith
v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); then citing Rodriguez v.
Klein, 960 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); then citing Am. Med. Elecs.,
Inc. v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied); then citing Judwin Props.,
Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, 911 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); and
then citing Bray v. Jordan, 796 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, no writ.))); see also Roy
Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice
Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 235, 235 (1994) (“Three distinct causes of action are potentially available to
clients for misbehavior by their lawyers: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of contract; and (3) the
tort of malpractice.”).
103. See Cotton v. Jones, No. 11-15-00142-CV, 2017 WL 3572818, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 17, 2017, no pet.) (holding the trial court erred in “denying [a]ppellant’s motion for
summary judgment on his anti-fracturing defense ground” because they found the “claims against
[a]ppellant for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, DTPA violations, and negligent
misrepresentation focuse[d] on the quality and adequacy of [a]ppellant’s legal representation” (first
citing Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416, 428 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,
no pet.); then citing Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied))); see also Parker v. Glasgow, No. 02-15-00378-CV, 2017 WL 2686474,
at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 22, 2017, no pet.) (finding summary judgment on a breach of
contract claim was appropriate as it was “nothing more than a recasting of [a] legal malpractice claim”).
Cf. Starwood Mgmt., LLC v. Swaim, 530 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. 2017) (recognizing the lower court’s
“dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim because the claim violated the anti-fracturing rule” but
not addressing the issue further as the plaintiff did not challenge the dismissal on appeal (citing Starwood
Mgmt., LLC, 530 S.W.3d at 701–02)).
104. See Young v. Day, No. 01-16-00325-CV, 2018 WL 1473931, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (“The rule prevents legal malpractice plaintiffs from
‘opportunistically transforming a claim that sounds only in negligence into other claims’ to avail
themselves of longer limitations periods, less onerous proof requirements, or other tactical
advantages.” (quoting Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 427)).
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action.105 While the anti-fracturing rule would not affect claims based on
the intentional disclosure of confidential client information, this rule would
substantially limit claims based on inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures
as those claims sound in negligence and thus, generally, would be classified
as a sole claim for legal malpractice.106 The elements of other potential
claims provide further evidence that the anti-fracturing rule would reduce a
client’s claims against his or her lawyer into a single cause of action for
malpractice.
In Texas, a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty requires the plaintiff to
establish: “(1) the existence of the fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of that
duty by the attorney defendant; (3) that causes; and (4) damages to the
plaintiff.”107 The first element of the claim would not be difficult to
establish as Texas law holds that a fiduciary relationship exists between a
lawyer and a client as a matter of law.108 The second element would be
105. See Young, 2018 WL 1473931, at *3 (“If the gist of a client’s complaint is that the attorney
did not exercise that degree of care, skill, or diligence as attorneys of ordinary skill and knowledge
commonly possess, then that complaint should be pursued as a negligence claim, rather than some
other claim.” (quoting Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P, 97 S.W.3d 179, 189 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.))); see also Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 192–94 (reversing the trial court’s
ruling in favor of the plaintiff against defendant attorney for breach of contract, violation of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and breach of fiduciary duty and holding each was “no more than a
claim for legal malpractice” (first citing Van Polen v. Wisch, 23 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); then citing Greathouse, 982 S.W.2d at 172; and then citing Black v. Willis,
758 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ))).
106. See Inadvertent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/
inadvertent [https://perma.cc/4VZJ-YPHU] (listing the word “unintentional” as a synonym for
inadvertent). The anti-fracturing rule applies to claims which are based on a lawyer’s negligence, which
means that the rule would not affect claims based on intentional misconduct by an attorney. See
Starwood Mgmt., LLC, 530 S.W.3d at 678 (reinforcing the anti-fracturing rule applies to professional
negligence claims). As the word “unintentional” is synonymous to the word “inadvertent,” we can
infer that a claim against an attorney based on an inadvertent disclosure of confidential client data
would not be a claim for intentional misconduct and would likely be a claim based on the attorney’s
negligence. Inadvertent, supra.
107. Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 429 (citing Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F. Supp. 2d 617, 661 (S.D.
Tex. 2008)); see Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.) (opining a plaintiff must prove to the jury “the existence of a fiduciary duty, breach of
the duty, causation, and damages” (citing Avary v. Bank of Am. N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 792 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2002, pet. denied))).
108. See Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 193–94 (indicating a “fiduciary relationship exists between
attorneys and clients as a matter of law” while ultimately finding the plaintiff’s claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against her attorney was “no more than a claim for legal malpractice” (first citing Arce
v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. granted); then citing Van
Polen, 23 S.W.3d at 515; then citing Greathouse, 982 S.W.2d at 172; and then citing Black, 758 S.W.2d
at 814)).
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much more arduous for a client to establish against his or her attorney based
on a breach of fiduciary duty claim for an inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of the client’s data to a third-party.109 This difficulty is caused
by the overlap between a legal malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary
claim, that is, in a claim for legal malpractice, the standard of care is often
asserted in terms of the fiduciary duties the lawyer owes to the client. 110
The courts, recognizing this commonality, have distinguished the claims by
emphasizing that a breach of fiduciary claim focuses on whether the lawyer
obtained an improper benefit stemming from his representation of the
client.111 A complaint by a client against a lawyer based on the inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure of his or her confidential client data would not
be based on a claim that the lawyer improperly benefited by intentionally
disclosing the data, but rather, would be substantiated by the lawyer’s failure
to protect the client’s data adequately.112 As such, a court would ultimately
dismiss a breach of fiduciary claim based on a lawyer’s inadvertent or
109. See Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 427–29 (recognizing the anti-fracturing rule does not stand for the
proposition that a client can only sue his or her lawyer for a negligence-based claim but asserting
“courts have most often applied those standards to conclude that the claims are really negligence, not
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims” (quoting Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 696 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, pet. denied))).
110. See Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 429 (“Because a lawyer’s ‘standard of care in negligence claims is
often defined by the characteristics of that inherent fiduciary relationship . . . courts refer to the
fiduciary relationship that the lawyer has to the client and use fiduciary standards to define the standard
of care required of lawyers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy, 241 S.W.3d at 696)).
111. See Cotton v. Jones, No. 11-15-00142-CV, 2017 WL 3572818, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 17, 2017, no pet.) (recognizing a breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses on whether the
lawyer received an improper benefit and holding that appellees argument that the appellant “obtained
an improper benefit in the form of ‘preserv[ing] his business and his license’” was not “the type of
improper benefit contemplated by a breach of fiduciary duty” (alteration in original) (first quoting
Kemp v. Jensen, 329 S.W.3d 866, 871–72 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied); and then citing
id.)); see also Won Pak v. Harris, 313 S.W.3d 454, 457–58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied)
(asserting “claims of breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney focus on whether the attorney
obtained an improper benefit from representing the client and involve the integrity and fidelity of the
attorney” but finding that the plaintiff’s allegations focused on the quality of the defendant attorney’s
“representation rather than the integrity and fidelity” (citing Murphy, 241 S.W.3d at 693)); Gibson v.
Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (noting a breach of a fiduciary duty occurs
when the lawyer “benefits improperly from the attorney-client relationship by, among other things,
subordinating his client’s interest to his own, retaining the client’s funds, engaging in self-dealing,
improperly using client confidences, failing to disclose conflicts of interest, or making
misrepresentations to achieve these ends” (citing Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 193)).
112. Cf. Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, P.C., 911 S.W.2d 498, 507 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding a plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim against its former
attorney for disclosure of confidential and privileged information was essentially a claim “for improper
disclosure of confidential information” and it “therefore . . . is couched entirely in legal malpractice”).
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unauthorized disclosure as the claim would be nothing more than a claim
for legal malpractice.
Similarly, under Texas law, many breach of contract claims brought in
addition to a legal malpractice claim would be dismissed as a result of the
Texas anti-fracturing rule.113 Where the underlying cause of action for a
breach of contract claim and a legal malpractice claim are both based on the
attorney’s negligence, the anti-fracturing rule would apply, and the claim
would be reduced to a malpractice claim.114 In Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs
& Harrison, P.C.,115 a Texas court of appeals was faced with the issue of
whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff Griggs on defendant Judwin’s breach of contract counterclaim.116
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had breached their contract when
they attached confidential and privileged information to their petition in the
original suit.117 The court recognized that there are instances where a
breach of contract claim against an attorney may exist independently from
a legal malpractice claim.118 Accordingly, the court explained that an
independent cause of action for breach of contract might be permissible
where the claim is based on excessive legal fees charged by the attorney. 119
113. See Futch v. Baker Botts, LLP, 435 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2014, no pet.) (concluding plaintiff’s claim against defendant law firm for breach of contract based on
the firm’s alleged disclosure of confidential client data was more appropriately characterized as a tort
claim rather than a breach of contract claim); see also Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 191 (holding plaintiff’s claim
that her attorney breached their contract by “not fulfill[ing] the terms of their contract and
abandon[ing] [her] on the day of trial” was, in essence, a claim for legal malpractice); Judwin Props., Inc.,
911 S.W.2d at 506, 508 (affirming the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of plaintiff for
defendant’s breach of contract counterclaim).
114. Futch, 435 S.W.3d at 387 (reinforcing where a claim is based on the attorney’s failure to
exercise the typical “degree of care, skill, or diligence” of a reasonably prudent attorney, the claim is
one for negligence and should be pursued as a claim for legal malpractice).
115. Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, P.C., 911 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
116. See id. at 500 (reviewing the lower court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of plaintiffattorneys on the defendant–client’s counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and gross negligence).
117. See id. (“In its petition, Griggs attached the hourly fee statements that described the nature
and extent of the services performed for Judwin. Judwin filed a counterclaim against Griggs alleging
that the statement of services Griggs attached to its petition contained confidential and privileged
information concerning Griggs’[s] representation of Judwin.”).
118. See id. at 506 (stating the court had previously “recognized a cause of action for breach of
contract independent of a legal malpractice claim” (citing Jampole v. Matthews, 857 S.W.2d 57, 61
(Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied))).
119. See id. (“‘[W]e distinguish between an action for negligent legal malpractice and one for
breach of contract relating to excessive fees for services.’” (quoting Jampole, 857 S.W.2d at 61)).

2019]

Comment

167

However, the court found that because the defendant’s underlying cause of
action for each of their counterclaims was based on the plaintiff’s disclosure
of confidential information, the counterclaims, including the breach of
contract claim, were “in the nature of a tort action . . . as opposed to
contract.”120 The exception recognized in Judwin would not be applicable
in a case where a client pursues a breach of contract claim against his or her
attorney based on an inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure. As this type
of breach of contract claim would not be based on excessive legal fees, the
claim would be more appropriately characterized as a tort claim for legal
malpractice rather than a breach of contract claim.121 Consequently, the
anti-fracturing rule would swoop in and eliminate a plaintiff’s claims for
breach of contract based on the attorney’s inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of confidential client data.
The Texas Disciplinary Rules expressly prohibit a lawyer from
intentionally revealing confidential client information. 122 An issue arises
where a hacker is able to access the client’s confidential information
electronically stored by a lawyer or law firm. It is doubtful that, under the
current version of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, disciplinary action would
hold a lawyer accountable for this type of breach.123 Consequently, as the
basis of this type of claim would be a lawyer’s negligence (for failing to take
reasonable steps to protect the client’s information), civil claims pursued by
120. Id.
121. Cf. id. (holding the breach of contract claim was more appropriately characterized as a tort
for malpractice because defendant–client’s counterclaim for breach of contract was based on the
plaintiff-attorneys “public disclosure of confidential information” and not based on disputed legal fees
in a contract).
122. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(b), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (mandating “a lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . [r]eveal confidential information of a client or a former client”).
123. Compare id. (asserting a lawyer cannot “knowingly . . . [r]eveal confidential information”),
with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (excluding the word
“knowingly” and simply stating “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client”). By omitting the word “knowingly” the Model Rules leave open the possibility of a lawyer
being disciplined for unknowingly revealing confidential client information. Id. Further evidence of
this can be found in Model Rule 1.6(c), one of the technology provisions which has not been added to
the Texas Disciplinary Rules. See id. R. 1.6(c) (requiring a lawyer to make “reasonable efforts to prevent
the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of . . . information relating to the representation of a
client”). Rule 1.6(c) of the Model Rules leads us to the inference that if a lawyer fails to make
“reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of . . . information relating
to the representation of a client[,]” the Model Rules allow for the lawyer to be disciplined for
unknowingly revealing confidential client information by failing to make those reasonable efforts
required. Id. R. 1.6.
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the client against the lawyer would be limited by the anti-fracturing rule. 124
Meaning that the most conceivable remedy for a client, and the most
plausible way in which a lawyer could be held liable in Texas, would be in a
civil claim against the lawyer for legal malpractice.
C. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and Legal Malpractice—
Informing the Courts on a Lawyer’s Duties
The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]n attorney malpractice
action in Texas is based on negligence.”125 A legal malpractice claim
requires the plaintiff to prove all elements of a negligence claim: duty,
breach, causation, and damages.126 When determining what duties the
lawyer owes to the client, courts look to “the standard of care that would be
expected to be exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney.”127 This
standard of care is said to be an “objective exercise of professional
judgment, not the subjective belief that his acts are in good faith.”128 The
preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules states that the Rules do not create
124. See Young v. Day, No. 01-16-00325-CV, 2018 WL 1473931, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (finding appellants’ only claim was for professional negligence
because of the rule against fracturing); Cotton v. Jones, No. 11-15-00142-CV, 2017 WL 3572818,
at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 17, 2017, no pet.) (reversing the trial court’s ruling because
appellee’s claims were more appropriately classified as a sole claim for legal malpractice); see also Parker
v. Glasgow, No. 02-15-00378-CV, 2017 WL 2686474, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 22, 2017,
no pet.) (holding that a breach of contract claim was barred by the anti-fracturing rule as the gravamen
of the complaint “focuse[d] on the quality or adequacy of appellees’ representation of her”); Won Pak
v. Harris, 313 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (“[W]e conclude the gist of
appellants’ allegations involves the quality of Harris’s representation rather than the integrity and
fidelity of the attorney. These complaints sound in negligence and not breach of fiduciary duty or
fraud.”).
125. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1989) (first citing Fireman’s Fund Am.
Ins. Co. v. Patterson & Lamberty, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); then
citing Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077 (Tex. App. 1904), rev’d on other grounds, 94 S.W. 324
(1906)).
126. See Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Tex. 2016) (“To prevail on a legal
malpractice claim, ‘the plaintiff must prove the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant
breached that duty, the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and the plaintiff suffered
damages.’” (quoting Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp.,
299 S.W.3d 106, 112 (Tex. 2009))); see also Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. 1995)
(“Generally, to recover on a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the attorney owed
the plaintiff a duty, (2) the attorney breached that duty, (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injuries, and (4) damages occurred.” (citing Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 665)).
127. Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416, 426 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2009, no pet.) (citing Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664).
128. Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 665.
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a private cause of action.129 While the rules do not establish a private cause
of action, Texas courts have not been disinclined in using the rules to help
understand the standards of the profession when determining (1) what the
lawyer’s duty was, and (2) if he or she breached that duty. 130
The Texas Supreme Court has never held that there is no place for the
Texas Disciplinary Rules in a civil action. For example, in In re Meador,131
the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the court of
appeals had “abused its discretion in granting mandamus relief compelling
disqualification” of the plaintiff’s attorney.132 Dana Meador, the relator,
argued that Masterson could not be disqualified as her attorney because he
had not specifically violated any of the disciplinary rules. 133 While the
Texas Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had abused its
discretion in disqualifying Masterson, they found that Meador’s reasoning
was flawed.134 The court stated that “a court has the power, under
appropriate circumstances, to disqualify an attorney even though he or she
has not violated a specific disciplinary rule.”135 Synonymously, an attorney
may be held liable for legal malpractice even though he or she did not breach
any rule of professional conduct.136 However, where a violation of a
professional conduct rule has occurred, a court may look to those rules to
129. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 15, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (“Violation of a rule does not give
rise to a private cause of action . . . .”); accord Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez,
467 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. 2015) (stating “[t]he Disciplinary Rules are not binding as to substantive law
regarding attorneys, although they inform that law” (citing In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350
(Tex. 1998))).
130. See Gillespie v. Hernden, 516 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied)
(holding “the Rules do not create standards of civil liability for attorneys, but courts may examine the
Rules to discern the policies and protections embodied in them as an aid in deciding questions of
attorney civil liability” (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble; then citing
Hoover Slovacek, LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2006); then citing Enochs v. Brown,
872 S.W.2d 312, 317–19 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ); and then citing In re Arizola, 410 S.W.3d
664, 671–72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied))).
131. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998).
132. Id. at 348 (citation omitted).
133. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 350 (“Meador first argues that the trial court could not
properly disqualify Masterson because he did not violate a specific disciplinary rule.”).
134. See id. at 351, 354 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
disqualify plaintiff’s attorney while asserting a court may bar an attorney even though a disciplinary rule
has not been violated).
135. Id. at 351.
136. See generally Luk v. Nguyen, No. 2008-38471, 2010 WL 10904102 (113th Dist. Ct., Harris
County, Tex. Dec. 13, 2010) (holding an attorney liable for legal malpractice without reference to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
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help determine if civil liability is appropriate.137 When bringing a tort claim
for malpractice, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 138 He or she must
prove that the conduct of the lawyer fell “below a standard of professional
care and reasonableness.”139 To do this, the plaintiff would call on an
expert witness to testify as to whether the lawyer’s conduct “met the
applicable professional standard.”140 As the Texas Disciplinary Rules do
not proscribe reference to the disciplinary rules by an expert, and as the
Texas Supreme Court has held that the rules can be used as guidelines, an
expert witness would be able to cite to them when undertaking to establish
whether the lawyer’s conduct fell below that of a reasonably prudent
attorney.141
The implementation of technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules, and more specifically, a provision requiring lawyers to take reasonable
precautions to protect against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures of
confidential client data, would be beneficial to the courts when determining
lawyer liability for legal malpractice suits.142 Where a client’s confidential
information is inadvertently taken, and the client subsequently sues his or
her lawyer alleging that the lawyer was negligent in the protection of that
137. Cf. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351 (implying a court may look to the disciplinary rules as
“guidelines” in a civil action by asserting the rules may be used as “guidelines for disqualification
motions”).
138. See Anderson & Steele, supra note 102, at 253 (asserting “in malpractice actions the burdens
of pleading and proof follow the normal procedural rules”).
To prevail in an action against an attorney for the tort of malpractice, a client must allege and
prove: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of a duty arising from the scope of that
attorney-client relationship; (3) that the conduct of the attorney was not that of a reasonable and
prudent lawyer; and (4) that but for the attorney’s misconduct the client would not have suffered
damage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
139. Id. at 254.
140. Id.
141. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 350 (noting the disciplinary rules are not “controlling
standards,” but instead mere guidelines); see also HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 127 (recognizing
“[t]he disclaimer in the Texas Rules does not expressly prohibit reference to a disciplinary rule by an
expert witness or in jury instructions”); TEXAS LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 79, at 1–
7 (asserting a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct could be used as
evidence of an attorney’s violation of “the appropriate standard of reasonable care”).
142. Cf. TEXAS LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 79, at 1–7 (implying
implementation of technology provisions would be beneficial to the courts when determining lawyer
liability for legal malpractice suits by indicating that a violation of the rules could be used as evidence
when “determining whether an attorney violated the appropriate standard of reasonable care in such a
suit”).
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client data, a court would be able to look to the Texas Disciplinary Rules to
help guide it in determining how a reasonably prudent attorney would have
acted and, more specifically, the precautionary measures he or she should
have taken to protect that information.143
D. Limitations in Malpractice Claims—Holding the Lawyer Accountable Through
Disciplinary Action
The implementation of technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct would help a court in determining whether
an attorney had a duty to protect against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of confidential client data and whether he breached that duty. 144
However, a plaintiff-client may still face issues in proving the other elements
of a legal malpractice claim. As noted previously, to recover on a legal
malpractice claim, a client must be able to establish that the lawyer owed
him a duty, that the lawyer breached that duty, and “that the breach
proximately caused” his damages.145 In some cases, where reference to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules is made, a client may be successful in
demonstrating all elements of a claim for legal malpractice—including
causation and damages.146 However, even where the technology provisions
would aid a client in demonstrating that the lawyer breached a duty of care,
the client may be denied relief, and the attorney may escape liability if the
client is unable to prove causation and damages.147 As each case is
different, this does not mean that the addition of technology provisions
would be superfluous. In the instances where a client would be unable to
143. Cf. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture v. Joe, 60 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001),
rev’d on other grounds, 145 S.W.3d 150, 162 (Tex. 2004) (allowing the use of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct to be used as evidence of the standard of care when determining lawyer
liability).
144. See id. (asserting the rules of professional conduct may be used “as evidence of a violation
of an existing duty of care” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52,
cmt. (f))).
145. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (citing McKinley v. Stripling,
763 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1989)).
146. See Joe, 60 S.W.3d at 905, 910 (determining a court may look to the disciplinary rules “as
evidence of the standard of care and breach of the standard” and holding there was evidence that the
defendant–attorney’s conduct caused the economic harm (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. (f))).
147. See generally Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 403 (Tex. 2017) (“The test for cause in fact
is whether the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about injury, without which
the harm would not have occurred.” (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d
472, 477 (Tex. 1995))).
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prove all elements of a legal malpractice claim based on an attorney’s failure
to make reasonable efforts to prevent against an inadvertent breach, the
addition of the technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules would
still allow the possibility of attorney discipline for that failure.148 With the
implementation of the technology provisions, a client would be able to file
a grievance against the attorney for his or her inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information.149
This Comment does not seek to go into detail on the procedure for
disciplinary action against an attorney. However, it is essential to recognize
that the addition of technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules
would require a lawyer to (1) keep abreast of changes in relevant technology,
and (2) make reasonable efforts to safeguard confidential client data. 150
Although under the grievance system, a client would not be able to recover
damages for an attorney’s failure to comply with the added technology
provisions, a grievance filed against an attorney could result in a reprimand,
suspension, disbarment, or being required to pay sanctions.151 This would
ultimately serve to (1) hold the lawyer accountable for failing to adequately
protect client data, (2) warn potential clients of the attorney’s past
negligence, and (3) caution the attorney that, in the future, he or she must

148. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 7, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (indicating the rules “stat[e]
minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action”); see also Grievance Procedure, ST. B. OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/Navigation
Menu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/GrievanceEthicsInfo1/GrievanceProcedure.htm
[https://perma.cc/P95K-48CP] (asserting an attorney will be subject to disciplinary action “only if
they have violated the ethics rules”).
149. See Grievance Procedure, supra note 148 (“Those who believe they have been a witness to
attorney misconduct . . . have the right to file a grievance against a Texas attorney.”).
150. As previously mentioned, the Texas Supreme Court recently amended Comment 8 of Rule
1.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules to include language which is similar to Comment 8 of Rule 1.1 of
the Model Rules—stating that a lawyer “should strive to become and remain proficient and competent
in the practice of law, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” T EX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.01 cmt. 8. However, the Texas Supreme Court’s efforts
fall short as they have failed to add an actual rule, such as Model Rule 1.6(c), establishing an affirmative
duty on the lawyer to make reasonable efforts to safeguard confidential client data.
151. See File a Grievance, ST. B. OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/Navigation
Menu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/GrievanceEthicsInfo1/File_a_Grievance.htm [https:
//perma.cc/DSQ8-XQLA] (explaining what the attorney grievance system cannot do); see also
Punishment for Professional Misconduct, ST. B. OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/
NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/GrievanceEthicsInfo1/MisconductPunis
hment.htm [https://perma.cc/QM64-KZ9S] (discussing the ways an attorney may be disciplined for
misconduct).
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proceed with caution when using technology to store confidential client
data.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2012, recognizing the potential impact technology could have on the
legal profession, the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to include the technology provisions.152 As of February 2019,
over half of all states have “enacted rules mandating that attorneys become
and remain familiar with technologies that may impact their practices.”153
While Texas has generally patterned its disciplinary rules for lawyers in
accordance with the ABA’s Model Rules, Texas is lagging behind in
updating its rules to reflect the modernization of technology. 154
Between 2016 and 2017, over 200 United States-based law firms were
subjected to a threat of a cyber breach by hackers.155 Texas-based law firms
are not miraculously immune from this type of risk.156 Recognizably, the
implementation of the technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules will not deter cyber-criminals from attempting to steal electronically
stored, confidential information.157 However, the implementation of the
technology provisions will serve as a proactive step towards protecting
electronically stored law firm data. As discussed previously, this protection
152. See generally Andropoulos, supra note 53 (recognizing the revisions made to Model Rules 1.1
and 1.6 to reflect the changes and advancement of technology); see also August 2012 Amendments, supra
note 20 (underlining the revisions made to the Model Rules in 2012).
153. See Andropoulos, supra note 53 (stating “over half of all jurisdictions” have passed some
type of provision requiring lawyers to remain competent in their use of technology and examining
some of the approaches taken by jurisdictions that have enacted those rules); see also Ambrogi, supra
note 27 (listing the states that have adopted provisions similar to the Model Rules 2012 technology
amendments).
154. See HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315 (acknowledging the past correlation between
the Model Rules and the Texas Disciplinary Rules); see also Ambrogi, supra note 27 (demonstrating the
State of Texas took seven years to add a provision similar to Comment 8 of Model Rule 1.1).
155. See Ian Lopez, DLA Piper Isn’t Alone—40% of Law Firms Unaware of Breaches, L. J. NEWSL.
(Aug. 2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/08/01/dlapiper-isnt-alone-40-of-law-firms-unaware-of-breaches/?slreturn=20180003102754 [https://perma.cc
/J52C-UTMT] (focusing on the substantial number of law firms not adequately prepared to protect
against a cyber breach).
156. See Browning, supra note 89 (asserting firms targeted by hackers include “Texas’ Baker
Botts, Vinson & Elkins, and Akin Gump, as well as national firms with Dallas offices like Weil Gotshal
& Manges, Jones Day, and Gibson Dunn & Crutcher”).
157. See Lopez, supra note 155 (recognizing the implementation of technology provisions will
not discourage cybercriminals by acknowledging the number of attempted hacks on law firms even
though the technology provisions found in the Model Rules were already in effect).
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will come in a number of ways. First, the implementation of the technology
provisions will place a lawyer and law firm on notice of the growing threat
of cyber breaches.158 In turn, this will—hopefully—forewarn the attorney
that if he or she does not make reasonable efforts to protect the
electronically stored data and a breach occurs, he or she may be subject to
disciplinary action and civil liability.159 While this would be the ultimate
goal of adding the technology provisions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules, it
is understandable that this might not always be the case. Where the
implementation does not cause the attorney to proceed with caution when
electronically storing client data, implementation of the technology
provisions will aid the courts in determining if civil liability against the
attorney is appropriate.160 Although the Texas anti-fracturing rule would
limit potential claims a client could bring against an attorney for an
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client data due to a cyber breach
as a result of the attorney’s negligence, relief would still be possible.161 A
client may be remedied, and a lawyer may be held liable, if the client can
prove all elements of a claim for legal malpractice.162 Implementation of
technology provisions will help the client in overcoming one obstacle in a
legal malpractice claim—establishing the standard of care the attorney
should have taken.163 As with any other claim, relief may be denied.
However, this does not mean that a lawyer will not be held accountable.
158. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072(d) (reinforcing the implementation of the
technology provisions will put a lawyer on notice of the growing cyber threats because lawyers are
required to abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules).
159. See id. (evincing a lawyer may be subject to disciplinary action because a lawyer is subject
to the Disciplinary Rules); see also Gillespie v. Hernden, 516 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (implying a court may consider violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct when determining an attorney’s liability).
160. See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. 2015)
(noting the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct help apprise the law when determining lawyer
liability).
161. See Young v. Day, No. 01-16-00325-CV, 2018 WL 1473931, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (explaining the anti-fracturing rule prohibits plaintiff’s from
bringing multiple claims against an attorney when each claim is based on the attorney’s alleged
negligence). This means that where a plaintiff brings multiple claims—including one for legal
malpractice—based on the attorney’s negligence, the anti-fracturing rule will dismiss additional claims
but the legal malpractice claim may still be available. Id.
162. See Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Tex. 2016) (discussing the elements required
for a plaintiff to succeed on a legal malpractice claim).
163. See TEXAS LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 79, at 1–7 (“[V]iolations of the
rules are nonetheless often evidentiary in determining whether an attorney violated the appropriate
standard of reasonable care in such a suit.”).
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Implementation of technology provisions into the Texas Disciplinary Rules
means that, for violations, the lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary
action.164
In February 2019, the Texas Supreme Court took a step in the right
direction by updating the Texas Disciplinary Rules—finally recognizing the
legal profession’s substantial reliance on the use of technology. 165 Prior to
that, it had been almost fourteen years since amendments were made to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules.166 Technology in the legal profession is clearly
here to stay. It is time for Texas to do more to safeguard electronically
stored client data. A rule must be added to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct to hold a lawyer accountable for failing to make
reasonable efforts to prevent against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosures of client data.

164. See id. (contending “a lawyer may be disciplined in connection with his license and privilege
to practice law” only by violating a rule within the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
165. Order Amending Comment to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct at 3,
No. 19–9016 (Tex. Feb. 26, 2019).
166. See HERRING ET AL., supra note 59, at 315 (maintaining the last time the Texas Disciplinary
Rules were amended was in 2005).

